General Interest Review 00019

Realism (international relations)

In the foreign policy realm, realism is a strand of thinking that leads states to act with only their own country in mind, even though the action is taking place outside their country. In the U.S., realist (so-called) policymakers have favored specific military initiatives that they claim will make the people living in the borders of the United States safer, and directly benefit the big picture foreign policy goals. Typically the realists have favored short-lived military offensives that have specific goals, but lead to miniscule gains in the abstract realm of security.

Under George H.W. Bush, realists Brent Scowcroft and Colin Powell collaborated to kick the Iraqi military out of Kuwait. Few American casualties were recorded, Americans witnessed video of missiles and tanks, and virtually nothing changed in the Middle East in the Americans' favor save the protection of a substantial oil investment the U.S. had in the Kuwaiti emirate.

The realists also claimed a policy victory in the debate over what to do in the Iraq War under George W. Bush when the president opted for a surge strategy. The objective was to send a limited number of troops, wipe out the places where anti-American militants were operating, and get out. In practice, the strategy allegedly worked. But rather than being a pure product of American ingenuity, it was helped along by things that Iraqis did. Not least of these was the declaration of a cease fire by Shiite leader Moqtadh al-Sadr just as the troop increase occurred. American troops no doubt found it easier to clear anti-American forces from the slums of Baghdad when they weren't being fired on.

The security gains were again negligible. An opposition force created solely by the presence of American troops that fought solely on Iraqi soil and posed a civil security threat only because the huge military base outside Baghdad is technically American soil will eventually be stamped out when there are no American troops for them to oppose. There was little sign of the need for increased military action -- with all the attendant casualties, civilian and military.

Two years later, the realists appear to have struck a cord with their first non-Bush -- Barack Obama. The recent escalation of the American war in Afghanistan has all the realist hallmarks -- increased troop levels (30,000) for a specific amount of time (roughly 18 months) with a clear objective (to kick the Taliban and al Qaida out of Afghanistan). Like the Iraq surge, the success of the Afghanistan escalation depends on the Afghans virtually alone. In order to stamp out the Taliban and al Qaida, the U.S. expects the Afghan people to help oppose the Taliban through violence and viewpoint. Also expected is that the people will look for leadership in Kabul, distinct as one of the most corrupt governments in the world.

It is of course ironic that a realist strategy does not require the policymaker to be realistic. Before an audience of people all dressed exactly the same, Obama claimed that the Afghan election was marred by fraud, but went off in accordance with Afghan law. This is likely false, unless fraud is permitted in the Afghan constitution. Obama claimed the Taliban must be stamped out because they harbored al Qaida. In fact, al Qaida and the Taliban had a dicey relationship shaped mostly by proximity. Afghanistan's moon-like frontier makes it easy to hide, and the Taliban were too busy trying to control Afghanistan to worry about a bunch of crackpots hiding in their midst attempting to control the entire world.

Perhaps these are small corrections when so much human life is on the line. But once they are inserted, the argument for the necessity of this escalation crumbles. Armed with the facts, it would be obvious that the Taliban poses no threat to the people within the borders of the United States. They only want to be left alone. Even the threat posed from al Qaida is unlikely to be completely stamped out. They can simply run to the strikingly similar moonlike frontier in Pakistan, or, as they did in the late 90s when Sudan kicked them out, move their base of operations to another barren country with an unstable central government incapable of opposing their presence, or indifferent to it.

Realism is simply a moniker that interprets reality. If an academic never proposed that certain players act according to the realist model, Scowcroft and Gates would be called something else. Remaining would be the limited effects of their so-called restraint and the high human cost attached. It seems plenty of thinkers could end at a strategy that fills caskets while achieving zilch.